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incentives to move are reduced. Our model illustrates several types of complementarity 
leading to multiple equilibria (a world of local social capital and low mobility vs. a world of low 
social capital and high propensity to move). It also shows that local social capital is 
systematically negative for mobility, and can be negative for employment, but some other 
types of social capital can actually raise employment. 
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Geographical mobility is one of the signs of a well-performing economy: it reveals the ability
to cope with change and to reallocate factors of production where they are more e¢ cient.
Residential mobility di¤ers widely across countries. The fraction of the 0-99 years old population
having moved to the current residence within a year is small in Europe, around 5% according
to estimates from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP hereafter). Further, it
varies across countries: residential mobility is lowest in Southern European countries (2.8% in
Spain, 2.7% in Portugal, 2.1% in Italy, 1.9% in Greece) and in countries such as Ireland and
Austria (1.9 and 2.3 respectively) and highest in Scandinavian countries (7.0% in Sweden, 9%
in Finland, 6.6% in Denmark) and Germany (6.8%). Regional mobility is also weak in Europe:
while in the US, about 30% of individuals were born in a di¤erent state, in Europe, this number
is typically around 20% for countries where regions have similar size as US states. In particular,
it is 19.2% in Belgium, 12.7 in Portugal, 16.8 in Austria. It is slightly higher in Spain (23.5%)
but Spain has smaller regions. On average in these 4 countries, the rate is 18.1%1.
In this paper, we provide an explanation for low mobility in Europe, and why it di¤ers across
European countries, in particular why it is lower in the South and higher in the North of Europe.
The explanation lies on geographical mobility costs. Our contribution is to associate mobility
cost to a concept of local social capital, which a¤ects the cost of moving. Local social capital
will characterize the ties of agents to their region/area of origin and is therefore partly or fully
depreciated upon mobility, leading to a decline in the welfare of movers.
In the European Community Household Panel, social capital measures are derived from the
three following questions:
 Are you a member of any club, such as a sport or entertainment club, a local or neighbor-
hood group, a party etc...?
 How often do you talk to any of your neighbors?
 How often do you meet friends or relatives not living with you, whether here at home or
elsewhere?
The answer to the rst question is yes/no (and is attributed the value 1 or 0). The answer
to the last two questions denes a frequency on a discrete support, as follows: 1. On most days;
1Here we reported only countries with large regions, thus excluding notably the UK, which has 46 regions, as
opposed for instance to Belgium which has three regions. See Wasmer et al. 2005 for regional mobility gures.
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Figure 1: Social capital in Europe: frequency of contacts with neighbors.
How often do you talk to your neighbors? An index measure
Source: ECHP, active population.
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2. Once or twice a week; 3. Once or twice a month; 4. Less often than once a month; 5. Never.
In order to simplify the exposition of the results, we build an index measure as follows:
Zi;t = I [Xi;t = 1] + I [Xi;t = 2] :
2
7
+ I [Xi;t = 3] :
2
30
+ I [Xi;t = 4] :
1
60
+ I [Xi;t = 5] :0,
where Zi;t is the index value for individual i at time t and Xi;t the answer to the question. I[:] is
an indicator function that takes value 1 if the expression in brackets is true and 0 if it is wrong.
Inspection of Figures 1 to 3 shows that there is indeed a North-South divide in the nature
of social capital: in the South of Europe (and in Ireland too), social capital seems to be more
associated with family ties and having friends, and less so with clubs and association membership.
The opposite holds in the North of Europe.
One way to summarize these di¤erences is to argue that social capital is more local in the
South, that is, more associated with a particular location. Presumably, the cost of moving to
another region is higher for individuals having strong family and friendly ties. In the North of
Europe, being part of clubs is instead much more frequent. To the extent that being a member
of a club (such as a Scrabble or a chess league) is geographically general because club members
can build new ties in another club in the new city, this helps to cope with mobility.
We have thus here an interesting explanation for mobility di¤erences across European coun-
tries. In the companion paper (David et al. 2008), we proceed to a formal empirical analysis
3
Figure 2: Social capital in Europe: frequency of contacts with friends and relatives.
How often do you meet friends or relatives not living with you, whether here at home or elsewhere?
An index measure
Source: ECHP, active population.
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Figure 3: Social capital in Europe: club membership.
Are you member of any club, such as a sport or entertainment club, a local or neighbourhood group,
a party etc...?
Source: ECHP, active population.
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establishing a few stable relations in the data, notably
1. Individuals endowed with more local social capital as described by the variables friend,
neighboror clubare less likely to move to another region in the short-run.
2. Individuals endowed with more local social capital such as described by the variables
friends or neighbors are more likely to become unemployed in the short-run.
3. In contrast, individuals who are members of a club are less likely to become unemployed
in the short-run.
4. Workers in a region di¤erent from their birth region have a lower stock of social capital in
all three dimensions measured (friend, neighborand club).
Given 1 and 4, causality between mobility and social capital goes both ways: we have thus
in principle both a channel for low mobility (the existence of local social capital) and a potential
theory of multiple equilibria. These are possibilities that we need to formally explore. Further,
their impact of social capital on unemployment is potentially ambiguous, as one could expect
social capital to have a positive impact on employability. We need to determine when the positive
e¤ect dominate over the negative one.
This is the aim of this paper. We base our modelling strategy on recent works on social capi-
tal, surveyed in the next section. The closest paper is by Glaeser et al. (2002), who introduce an
explicit theory of endogenous social capital characterized, in their work, as association member-
ship. They notably argue that social capital declines with expected mobilityand conrm the
prediction with an expected probability score based on demographics. In a somewhat di¤erent
context, Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004a and b) argue that US Blacks workers are less mobile
than Whites because of family ties (2004b) and successfully test this using the PSID survey.
As a matter of fact, our model emphasizes that the relation between local social capital and
mobility has two causalities. On the one hand, the anticipation of mobility a¤ects social capital
investments, as in Glaeser et al. (2002). If agents perceive themselves as being strongly attached
to a village, a township or a region, they will invest in local social capital, because the returns
of those local ties are high. On the other hand, highly local social capital raises the cost of
mobility and in turn reduces mobility. Finally, if individuals expect their friends to remain in
the neighborhood as well, the returns to creating social ties are larger. This social externality
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creates multiple equilibria and thus potentially reinforces the low mobility of some regions or
demographic groups. As a result of these two self-reinforcing causalities and this externality,
within the European countries and regions of low mobility, local social capital is a binding
factor: even strong economic incentives to migrate, such as regional unemployment di¤erentials,
are insu¢ cient and individuals prefer to live on welfare and enjoy local social capital.
Our model illustrates the several types of complementarity leading to multiple equilibria (a
world of local social capital and low mobility vs. a world of low social capital and high propensity
to move). It also shows that local social capital is systematically negative for mobility, and can be
negative for employment, but some other types of social capital can actually raise employment.
Needless to say, our paper is not the rst one to involve geographical mobility among the
determinants of unemployment. Another very close paper is the inuential work by Bertola
and Ichino (1996), among the very rst to document the inability of European workers to
move to more dynamic regions. This arose according to the authors, because of wage and
income compression, lowering the returns from mobility. To understand the determinants and
implications of low mobility, we do not focus on the returns of mobility, as in Bertola and Ichino
(1996), even though this dimension will be present, but, in a dual perspective, on the costs
of mobility. The novelty of our approach is rst to give an explicit content to mobility costs,
namely social capital, and to make it endongeous, while in many theoretical analyses including
large portions of urban and regional economics, mobility costs are exogenous.
In Section 1, we will rst review the ample literature on social capital and emphasize its
implicit or explicit geographical dimensions, notably what we call localness. It is interesting
to note that most works surveyed emphasize the positive role of social capital on labor market
performance, while we tend to emphasize some negative channels. A counterexample is Bentolila
et al. (2004), who focus more specically on European countries, and emphasize the potential
negative links between social capital and labor markets - in particular, the fact that jobs obtained
through social networks tend to have a wage discount, distorting choices towards ine¢ ciency.
In Section 2, we develop a theory embedding the mechanisms found in the data. We will
characterize how various types of social capital have di¤erent impacts on mobility and unem-
ployment rates. We start by dening social capital and notably assume it has two dimensions: a
local one, i.e. a fraction is depreciated when an agent moves to another region, and a professional
one, i.e. a fraction is depreciated when the agent is unemployed. Both depreciation rates matter
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in the mobility/job acceptance decisions. We rst illustrate one side of the bilateral causality:
local social capital reduces geographical mobility within a simple, tractable model of wage o¤ers.
We also nd that social capital raises unemployment if the local dimension of social capital dom-
inates over its professional dimensions, that is, if depreciation of social capital is greater after
a geographical move than after job loss. The fact that the relative depreciation rates matters
for the sign of the impact of social capital on unemployment justies why we consider the two
dimensions of social capital, since it helps to rationalize the empirical results.
Then, in Section 3, we explore the determinants of social capital. We nd the existence of
two local maxima in the net returns of local social capital, implying that observationally close
individuals may behave very di¤erently: some will not invest much in local social capital and will
thus be more mobile and better employed, while others will invest more in local social capital
and prefer to remain at the margin more locally unemployed. This is a rst complementarity
between immobility and social capital. We then allow agents to choose the type of social capital
(local or professional) under constraint and nd another complementarity: when the ex-ante
probability of being unemployed is larger than the ex-ante probability of moving to another
region, agents invest more in local social capital.
Section 4 presents an extension: employment protection is shown to induce local social
investments and therefore to reduce mobility. The Appendix presents a second extension: the
presence of a social externality is natural in this context. The more likely the friends of an
individual are to remain in a geographical area, the higher the returns to investing in social skills.
This leads to multiple equilibria and thus a third type of complementarity: a low mobility/high
local social capital coexists with a high mobility/low social capital.
Our work is a rst step to clarify the concept of local social capital and derive some important
implications. It points out robustly to the fact that unemployment and low mobility are linked
and that if low mobility is partly due to economic factors, it is also in a large part due to social
factors over which policy makers have little control.
1 Social capital: a selective survey
Surveying the concept of social capital is beyond the scope of this work: denitions of social
capital are numerous. The aim of this section is instead to briey review the existing literature
on social capital under the concept of localnessand argue that the geographical dimension of
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social capital is often implicit. This will serve as a basis for the main assumption made in this
paper. In the second part of the section, we also survey the use of social capital (local or not)
in the labor literature.
1.1 Localness of social capital
In their review of the literature on social capital, Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) point to its ori-
gin with the seminal works of Loury (1977) and later Coleman (1988). They mainly distinguish
two di¤erent denitions of social capital. First, there are the outcome-orienteddenitions (see
Coleman (1990), Putnam et al.(1993), Fukuyama (1995)). These denitions insist on the impor-
tance of group externalities caused by the existence of social capital. They are more concerned
with the consequences of the existence of social capital than with its nature. Second, there are
denitions focussing on the nature of the relations and the interdependence of individuals em-
bodied in social capital (see Putnam (2000), Bowles and Gintis (2002) and Lin (2001)). Among
di¤erent authors, Durlauf and Fafchamps identify two main ideas for our purpose: rst, social
capital has positive exernalities to group members ; second, the externalities are associated with
shared trust, norms and values2.
In what follows, we do not necessarily want to follow the distinction function vs. nature,
as the localness of social capital is clearly one aspect of its nature, but at the same time the
consequences of social capital notably in terms of externality and spillover are often local too.
In the nature category of works, and even before the term social capitalwas introduced,
one can nd studies on related issues. For instance, Jacobs (1961) work on large U.S. cities
underlined how implicit rules matter in neighborhoods. The knowledge of those implicit rules
allows for building trust. She notably showed that social ties are stronger in older neighborhoods.
This work is one of the earliest in which the geographical dimension of social capital is underlined:
social ties as dened here cannot be moved from one place to another.
Coleman (1990) identies di¤erent forms of social capital: 1) obligations and expectations
that depend on the trustworthiness of the social environment; 2) capability of information; and
3) norms accompanied by e¤ective actions. Some have a local dimension, others do not (think,
for instance, of norms that inhibit crime in a particular neighborhood or norms in a community
that support and provide rewards for high achievement in school, etc.). On the destruction side,
Coleman (1990, p. 321) states that social capital can depreciate if there is no investment to
2Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) p. 5
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renew it. Social relationships die out if not maintained; expectations and obligations wither
over time; and norms depend on regular communication. Although there is no explicit spatial
dimension here, a simple cost-benet analysis suggests that being further away (geographically)
raises maintenance cost of social capital and is associated with lower stock in equilibreium.
Our model will be in part inspired by the economic approachto social capital of Glaeser
et al. (2002). They propose a theoretical framework in which they treat social capital as an
individual rather than a community characteristic. The utility ows are determined by the
individual amount of social capital and the aggregate level. Their main ndings related to our
concerns are the following: 1) Investment in social capital, like other investments, changes over
the life cycle. It tends rst to increase and then to decrease with age. 2) In order to test the
e¤ect of social capital on mobility, they build an expected mobility measure and nd a strong
negative correlation between social capital and this measure. 3) Home-ownership increases the
investment in social capital. In particular, they predict more investment in local social capital.
On the contrary, Winters et al. (2001), (pp. 181-182.), analyzing the e¤ect of networks in the
choice of migration from Mexico to the United States, nd that there could be a positive link
between social capital and migration, since networks provide information on where to move.
Kumar and Matsusoka (2004) introduce an interesting distinction between two types of social
capital: village capital and market capital. The former consists of social networks, especially
kinship, patron-client relations, and informal agreements within small groups of people that are
enforced by reciprocity and social sanctionswhich we would call local in our labor market
context. They provide several examples to explain why localized economies accumulate this
kind of social capital and why it improves e¢ ciency.3
Finally, it is worth noting, however, that social capital is not exclusively local, and can
instead be built in order to promote mobility. A very good example is the development of
Rotary Clubs in the beginning of the 20th century in the US, which was orginally designed to
reproduce the social environment of professionals having moved from one place to the other, as
a substitute to local social capital precisely. 4
3The other concept, Market capital, consists of knowledge that facilitates transactions between potential
strangers and parties who are unlikely to transact again in the future. Village capital is best when economic ac-
tivity is primarily local and market capital is essential for transactions between strangers and for the development
of the economy.
4We thank Robert Putnam for this relevant example. On the web page of the Rotary Club, it is indede stated
that The worlds rst service club, the Rotary Club of Chicago, Illinois, USA, was formed on 23 February 1905
by Paul P. Harris, an attorney who wished to recapture in a professional club the same friendly spirit he had felt
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1.2 Social capital in labor markets
In the labor market, social capital is usually considered to improve economic performance.
The main channel in the literature is that social capital conveys information and leads to an
improvement of the quality of the match between employers and employees, leading authors to
nd a positive e¤ect on productivity and wages. For instance, Granovetter (1995) studies how
workers nd their jobs. In his study, social capital improves overall welfare through the creation
of an e¢ cient network made of social ties that allows for better expectations.
The idea that social capital improves individualsperspectives on the labor market has been
investigated more recently. See, for instance, Calvó-Armengol (2004) and Calvó-Armengol and
Jackson (2004, 2006). In these works, there is a distinction between weak and strong ties, fol-
lowing Granovetters view. Calvó-Armengol et Jackson (2004) propose a theoretical framework
where they assume that the probability of nding a new job (for an unemployed agent) or to
nd a better job (for already employed agents) depends on the social network of the agent. This
model explains both the lower rate of employment and the lower wages of individuals endowed
with a weaker social network. In Calvó-Armengol (2004), network structures are endogenously
created by workers strategic actions. He shows that networks with di¤erent structures may
induce di¤erent aggregate unemployment levels.
Montgomery (1991) studies the importance of the referrals to outcomes on the labor market.
He assumes that there are both low- and high-ability workers and that ability is not observable by
rms before the match. Ties are more likely to link di¤erent types of workers among themselves
(high- with high-ability workers and low with low). Before accepting a job, a worker compares
the various job o¤ers and accepts the highest-paying job. This model highlights the importance
of referrals and helps to explain why well-connected workers get higher wages and why rms
hiring workers through referrals might earn higher prots.
In their survey analyzing the network e¤ects on labor-market outcomes and inequality, Ioan-
nides and Loury (2004) emphasize seven stylized facts based on both, the recent sociological
and economic literature. First, there is a widespread use of friends, relatives and acquaintances
during job searches. Second, this use varies by location and demographic characteristics. Third,
it is generally productive to use ones network to get a job. The fourth and fth stylized facts
in the small towns of his youth. The name Rotary derived from the early practice of rotating meetings among
memberso¢ ces.
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concern the productivity of the job search, which happens to depend on demographic charac-
teristics. The sixth fact relates to the increasing use of the Internet. Finally, they observe
di¤erences across countries in the use of personal contacts by rms and workers.
Most of these works emphasize the positive links between social capital and economic per-
formance, while our work emphasizes potentially negative channels. In that, we follow Bentolila
et al. (2004), who investigate the possible detrimental e¤ects social capital may have on labor-
market outcomes. Using ECHP data, as in our paper, they focus on the impact of social capital
on occupational choices. They argue (page 2) that on average, jobs found through social con-
tacts are obtained more quickly but also pay lower wages, since at least some of them are lled by
workers who sacriced their productive advantage in order to get a job more easily. They nd
a wage discount of 3% to 5 % in Europe and the US for jobs obtained through social contacts.
Finally, Belot and Ermisch (2006) share similar ideas to ours. They show from the British
Household Panel Study that geographical proximity of friends matters for mobility decisions.
Compared to our data, their dataset has the interesting characteristic that it allows to explore
two dimensions of the strength of social ties: location of the closest friends and frequency of
contacts. Their results emphasize the importance of the rst factor. While we are also interested
in the link between local ties and mobility decisions, both our theoretical model and empirical
ndings in Quentin et al. (2008) highlight several complementarities between the two with
common consequences for unemployment and contribute to the debate in Europe.
1.3 Our concept of social capital
At this stage of the paper, there are many denitions of social capital, and we need to dene
it more precisely to serve our purpose: to link it with geographical mobility and employment
decisions. The key concept here is the localness of social capital. For that, let us think of an
individual living in a region, say A. Assume she is endowed with S units of social capital. Once
she leaves region A, her social capital is depreciated: she only retains a fraction of it. Let us
denote by  the depreciation rate, which describes the degree of localness of social capital. We
may think for instance that by leaving the native region, she looses  of her friends, or meets
her relative less frequently.
As argued in introduction, social capital is also to some extent professional, which is a second
dimension of social capital useful to consider. Indeed, this dimension must have a rst-order
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impact on job acceptance decisions, in the sense that, upon loosing ones job, one may loose a
few social connections too. Let us denote by 1   the fraction retained by an individual after
job loss, and thus  is the associated depreciation rate.
The set of parameters (; ) allows us to describe various types of social capital, as follows:
  = 1 and  = 1 would correspond to being a member of a local and professional
association (e.g. the association of textile engineers in a given region, e.g. the North of
France)
  = 1 and  = 0 would correspond to being a member of a local sport club (e.g. a local
soccer club) or having friends in ones neighborhood.
  = 0 and  = 0 would correspond to being a member of a country-wide association
(e.g. Scrabble, chess)
  = 0 and  = 1 would correspond to being a member of a country-wide economic
association (such as the American Economic Association).
Although it may not be immediately clear why we focus on these two dimensions of social
capital, we will see in the theory part that this is a necessary distinction to rationalize the
empirical results, notably the e¤ect of social capital on the unemployment probability.5
Denition. Social capital is said to be local if  > , that is if more is lost from a regional
move than from job loss.
Our distinction between local and professional capital can easily be compared to that of weak
and strong ties. In Calvó-Armengól et al. (2007), strong ties is seen as linking members of the
same family or very close friendsand weak ties as a transitory social encounter between two
persons. However here we will have a denition exclusively based on the depreciation of social
capital, to simplify our analysis.
5We could have simplied the analysis and set right away  = 0, but we decided to keep the general case,
rst to rationalize some empirical ndinds, second because employment decisions are clearly a¤ected by the gain
or loss of social capital: deciding to reject a job o¤er and remain long-term unemployed can lead to such a social
capital depreciation that it becomes in principle a key element of the decision. Hence, we believe that the general
case where  and  take any arbitrary value between 0 and 1 is useful. In addition, Section 3.2 presents an
extension where individuals choose not only S, but also the fractions  and  given their expectation about
wage o¤ers and mobility.
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2 Model
2.1 Setup
To simplify the setup, we will rst think of social capital in a reduced form approach as simply
raising utility of individuals. Indeed, there are several channels through which more social
capital raises ex-ante utility, such as insurance, information ows or complementarity with the
consumption of leisure. Having a fully developed model along these dimensions is beyond the
task of the theory part here, since we are already focussing on other dimensions, like the localness
of social capital and mobility decisions.
We consider a typical worker living two periods. Jobs last one period to simplify the expo-
sition, and this assumption is relaxed in the extension Section. There are two regions. Without
loss of generality, we assume the worker is born in region A, lives and works there in period 1.
She may eventually leave region A to go to region B in second period or stay in region A. Period
2 is discounted with a factor  < 1.
At the end of period 1, the worker is endowed with S units of social capital. S will be made
endogenous later on but at this stage, it is useful to consider it as given. Social capital is partly
local, in the sense that a mover to region B would enjoy only a fraction (1   )S of social
capital. Similarly, a fraction 0  1    1 of social capital is retained if the worker is laid o¤.
We assume that social capital increases utility only in second period, as a reduced form. Let 
2
be the income of the individual in second period. To simplify, we assume that utility in second
period U2 is
U2 =
8>><>>:

2 + S if the worker is employed in region A

2 + (1  )S if the worker is non-employed in region A

2 + (1  )S if the worker is employed in region B

2 + (1  )(1  )S if the worker is non-employed in region B
.
The labor market is a standard partial equilibrium search set-up. All jobs last only one
period, so that all individuals start period 2 in having to prospect for a job. We relaxe this as-
sumption in Appendix and investigate the role of more stable employment relationships (lasting
more than one period) and notably the role of employment protection.
In the beginning of the second period, workers receive one job o¤er with a wage w from
a cumulated distribution F in region A and one job o¤er with a wage w from a cumulated
distribution G in region B (f and g are the associated densities). The random draws are
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uncorrelated. We denote by w the upper support of those distributions.6 In a world where all
regions are symmetric and have the same labor market conditions, one may think that G > F
(rst order stochastic dominance) to reect that workers have more local contacts and thus
receive better local o¤ers. For instance, an interesting rationalization is that workers receive
multiple independent o¤ers in quantity n and p with n > p from a common distribution F0: one
can easily show, in such a case, that the expected value of the wage is for instance
R w
0 wd(F
n
0 (w))
or alternatively that F = Fn0 and G = F
p
0 .
7 However, we have also in mind to reproduce the
intuition that some regions are depressed and other regions are booming, in which case we expect
the opposite: many good o¤ers in region B, hence G small for a large part of the support of
the wage distribution, and few good o¤ers in region A, hence F large on the main part of the
support.
Finally, if non-employed, we assume that workers receive an income 
2 = b interpreted as
unemployment benets or leisure independent of social capital.
2.2 Workersprogram
In second period, there are four possible choices: staying in the home region and remaining
unemployed ; moving and remaining unemployed ; staying and accepting the local wage o¤er ;
moving and accepting the foreign job o¤er. We can discard the second possibility, given that
U2 = b+(1 )(1 )S is always lower than b+(1 )S if the individual remains unemployed
in the home region. The decision set is thus summarized by
U2(S) =Max fb+ (1  )S;w + S;w + (1  )Sg , (1)
where the max operator reects the optimal mobility/job acceptance decisions, which are the
joint decision explored next Section. O¤ers in and out the region occur simultaneously and so
are decisions by the agent to move or to stay and to accept a job or remain unemployed. See
notably the Appendix for the decision tree of the agent: the worker compares her (best) local
o¤er w, her best foreign o¤er w and her outside option b, as indicated in equation (1).
At this stage, there are two useful notations we can introduce: the reservation wage for an
o¤er in region A is dened as
wr = b  S. (2)
6 If they are di¤erent, we simply extend the c.d.f beyond its support. We also assume that the lower bound of
the support is 0 in both case.
7See Lemma A1, Theorem A2 and Corollary A3 in Theory Appendix.
14
This is the local wage making the agent indi¤erent between accepting a job or rejecting the
o¤er. This is increasing in b and decreasing in social capital, unless social capital is totally
non-professional ( = 0): the worker has more to loose in rejecting a job o¤er if this reduces its
utility by the loss of social capital S. A higher S raises the acceptance rate in region A except
in the singular case  = 0. This o¤ers the possibility of a positive impact of S on employment.
Symmetrically, the reservation wage for an o¤er in region B would be
wr = b+ (   )S. (3)
One can notably see that when social capital is local (recall that it was dened as local if
 > ), more social capital raises wr and thus reduces the acceptance rate of o¤ers and
consequently it reduces geographical mobility. Again the idea is simple, in accepting a job in
region B and living ones friends, the individual faces a depreciation S, compensated by the
no-depreciation of S. Hence, the trade-o¤. We have here a mechanism for either a positive or
a negative impact of S on unemployment, depending on localness of social capital.
In words, to the extent that social capital is local, workers are potentially marginally more
immobile. To the extent that most o¤ers comes from other regions than where workers currently
live, as has been the case in several high unemployment regions (Bertola and Ichino, 1996), we
have here a channel for the persistence of high unemployment.
Note here, that the decisions to accept and to move are simultaneous, these intuitions, albeit
correct, must be studied in the more complex setup where all o¤ers arrive simultaneously. This
is dened in the next few lines, where the notations wr and wr remain useful.
2.3 Geographical mobility and social capital
The ex-ante probability of moving is denoted by Pm. It depends on the value of w but also
on the value of w. Remember that the draws in F and G are not correlated, for simplicity.
Formally, the Appendix determines that
Pm =
Z w
wr
F (z   S)g (z) dz. (4)
For a worker to be mobile, it requires a wage o¤er in region B above its reservatation wage wr
(hence the integral between wr and the upper support of wage o¤ers) and a local wage o¤er
su¢ ciently low compared to the current o¤er z net of depreciated social capital if the worker
moves (hence the term F (z   S) representing the fraction of such low local o¤ers).
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It is then informative to examine how this probability varies with S. We obtain:
dPm
dS
= (   )F (wr)g(wr)  
Z w
wr
f(z   S)g(z)dz. (5)
The interpretation is easy, and is the sum of two e¤ects conveniently corresponding to the two
terms in equation (5). The second term is the easiest to interpret. Except in the extreme case
 = 0 where social capital has no local dimension, it is always negative: a higher S means a
higher loss of social capital in case of geographical mobility and thus reduces the number of
acceptable o¤ers in region B.
The rst e¤ect is more subtle. To understand it, imagine a marginal worker receiving a
local o¤er below wr in region A and a marginal o¤er wrin region B. She is indi¤erent between
di¤erent options (moving or remaining unemployed. We know that she looses  of social capital
if she rejects both o¤ers, and  of social capital if she accepts the o¤er in region B. So, giving
her one more unit of social capital makes her more likely at the margin to remain in region A if
the loss  is larger than the loss , e.g.     < 0.
Proposition 1. E¤ect of social capital on the mobility rate.
i) A su¢ cient condition for mobility to decline with S is that  >  i.e. in the case of
(relatively more) local social capital; ii) When  > , wr increases to w (possibly equal to
+1) as S ! +1 and thus the mobility rate goes to zero ; iii) A su¢ cient condition for mobility
to increase with S is that  = 0 and  > 0 (non local but professional social capital).
The rst part of the proposition corresponds to the case where social capital is more depre-
ciated when the worker moves than when she is non-employed, which we believe characterizes
well social capital such as friendship or neighborhood relations. As social capital becomes larger,
incentives to move disappear. The last part of the proposition corresponds to the case when
social capital is not local and is to some extent a professional one.
2.4 Employment, unemployment and social capital
The model also suggests various other relations between the employment status and social
capital. We have, notably the probability of being unemployed is
Pu = F (w
r)G(wr). (6)
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The interpretation of (6) is easy: workers are unemployed if they receive two o¤ers below
their reservation wage. The impact of social capital is thus straightforward: we have (see also
Appendix)
dPu
dS
=  f(wr)G(wr) + F (wr)g(wr)(   ). (7)
We thus have:
Proposition 2. E¤ect of S on unemployment.
i) A su¢ cient condition for social capital to raise unemployment is  = 0 ; ii) Another
condition is that G is small and F is large at the thresholds wr and wr and that social capital
is local  >  ; iii) When  > 0, wr ! 0 when S ! +1 and thus the unemployment rate
goes to zero ; iv) A su¢ cient condition for social capital to reduce unemployment instead is
 > , i.e. when social capital is more professional than local; v) In the general case, the e¤ect
is ambiguous.
The rst part states that, as argued above, social capital moderates wage claims if it depre-
ciates upon unemployment. When  = 0, the only impact of social capital is that it reduces
mobility due to localness. When G is large and F is small around the thresholds, this means
that there are few good o¤ers in region B and many good o¤ers in region A: conditions are
gathered for the localness e¤ect to dominate over the e¤ect of professional depreciation of social
capital. The other parts of the proposition are derived from the same logic.
Finally, the probability of nding a job in the local region is
Pw =
Z w
wr
G(z + S)f (z) dz. (8)
The interpretation is similar to that of the probability of moving: for a worker to nd a local
job, the wage must be above the local reservation wage (hence the integral between wr and
the upper support of the distribution of wages) and the wage o¤ers in region B must be low
compared to the local wage o¤er given the depreciation of local social capital in case of a move
to B (hence the term G(z + S) representing the fraction of such low o¤ers). In addition, we
have:
Proposition 3. The local employment probability is always increased by social capital except
if  =  = 0 in which case the probability is una¤ected by S.
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Indeed,
dPw
dS
= G(w
r)f(wr) + 
Z w
wr
g(w + S)f(w)dw.
As before, the interpretation is easy: the rst term represents the e¤ect of one additional unit
of social capital for a worker receiving an o¤er wr and with an o¤er w below wr: she accepts
the local o¤er all the more than her social capital is depreciated. The second term is zero if
 = 0 and positive otherwise: it reects the supplementary gain from accepting a local o¤er
when being away in region B depreciates social capital. When  =  = 0, S is just scaling up
utility but does not a¤ect the arbitrage of worker between the di¤erent options.
2.5 Partial conclusion
We have provided a relatively simple and exible model leading to the predictions summarized
in Table 1. Columns 2 and 3 correspond to the case of local social capital. In that case, social
capital reduces mobility with either ambiguous or positive e¤ects on unemployment. Local
employment is raised in each case, as workers accept fewer outside o¤ers. One would thus
expect, ceteris paribus, that, when social capital is exogenous, the unemployment rate is higher
in regions with more local social capital, and that the marginal e¤ect of social capital is larger
if there are few good o¤ers locally. It is also interesting to note that the e¤ect of social capital
on unemployment is potentially both positive or negative, depending on the nature of social
capital: when social capital is mostly professional, unemployment probability is decreased: the
e¤ect works through a reduction in the reservation wage, as individuals have more to loose to
turn down a job o¤er.
Let us now make S endogenous and explore its determinants.
3 Optimal social capital
Thanks to the assumption that jobs last one period, the decision to invest in social capital in
rst period is independent from the activity status (employed, non-employed) in rst period.
We can thus describe the decisions recursively, in two steps. In the second period, workers take
S as predetermined and, after collecting o¤ers, decide whether to accept local o¤ers or foreign
o¤ers. In rst period, they anticipate their decisions in second period and decide accordingly
how much to invest in social capital. Before period 1, workers are assumed to be attached to
region A and thus immobile: the decisions at this stage are not relevant for the next steps and
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we ignore them.
In rst period, workers maximize U1 dened as ex-ante rst period utility, which is given by:
U1 = max
S
f
1   C(S) + EU2(S)g , (9)
where  is a discount factor and the cost of investing in social capital S is C(S) with C 0(S) > 0,
C 00(S) > 0. The key issue is thus to determine the quantity
EU2 =
Z w
0
Z w
0
max fb+ 1  S;w + S;w + (1  )Sg dF (w)dG(w). (10)
It is a relatively complex derivation but it can be simplied after a few variable changes and
integration by parts. Indeed, we show in Appendix that the expected utility of agents given
optimal choices is given by
EU2 = w + S  
Z w
wr
G(z + S)F (z)dz. (11)
In the above formula, the impact of social capital on the expected utility is threefold. There is
a positive direct e¤ect on utility. The second and third e¤ects, through the integral term, are
actually negative (recall that wr is decreasing in S whenever  > 0). As we will show, these
two last e¤ects arise from the fact that social capital reduces mobility and job acceptance: we
can link the marginal e¤ect of S to the various probabilities calculated above. This is done in
the next Sub-Section.
3.1 Choice of the level of S
Let us rst make the assumption that social capital is mostly local, i.e. depreciates more after
a regional move than after job loss. This is from now on the benchmark case. In equations:
Assumption 1.  >  > 0.
This yields some useful properties of dEU2dS .
Lemma 1. Properties of dEU2=dS.
i) dEU2dS = 1 Pu Pm> 0 ; ii) under Assumption 1, we have dEU2=dS ! 1 when S !
+1 ; iii) d2EU2=dS2 is strictly positive so that dEU2=dS strictly increases, except if either
 =  = 0 or f = g = 0. In these two cases, the second derivative is zero.
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From equation (11), we have the marginal e¤ect of S which can conveniently be rewritten,
using (8) and (6). The return to social capital is therefore always strictly positive. A marginal
increase in S raise utility by 1, minus the probability of moving Pm (in which case  is depre-
ciated) minus the probability of remaining unemployed locally (in which case a fraction  of
social capital is depreciated). In the neutral case  =  = 0, the marginal return to social
capital is constant, equal to 1.
The second point comes from the limits of Pm and Pu in Propositions 1 and 2. The last point
is shown in Appendix. The interpretation is simple: except in the case of neutralsocial capital
or with degenerate distribution of wage o¤ers, utility is convex in social capital. Convexity arises
when distributions are not degenerate because, by raising social capital, the agent can a¤ord
to reject more o¤ers and thus optimize its mobility/acceptance strategy (in other words, she is
better o¤ because she has greater outside options).8
Denote by bS a level of S satisfying the rst-order condition. We have
C 0(bS) = (1   Pu Pm), (12)
where Pu and Pm depend on bS too. Equation (12) may be satised for more than one value ofbS. To see this, one can draw the left hand side of equation (12) which is an increasing function
of S and the right hand side which is convex. The two curves can intersect several times - or not
at all. We only know that for large values of S, the right-hand side converges to 1, while, with
a quadratic cost function, the left hand side, the marginal cost, goes to innity, so that utility
decreases after the last intersection which is thus a minimum. We represent utility in Figure 4
in one of the multiple intersectionscase.
In such a case, there is usually a well dened global maximum (either the rst or the second
maximum) and the agent optimally chooses one or the other. The point we want to make is
that a small deviation between two individuals, say, because they marginally di¤er in their cost
functions, may lead them to behave observationally very di¤erently. In Figure 4, the agent
would choose a low degree of local social capital and hence would be ex-ante relatively mobile.
Imagine now that the marginal cost of investing is decreased by a tiny amount: then, the bimodal
curve changes, it is like a counter-clockwise rotation (due to C(S) being relatively more reduced
8The quantity d3EU2=dS3 is calculated in Appendix. As a special case, when both f 0 and g0 are uniformally
negative on their support, which is a widely used property in contract theory and known as the CRDC (concavity
of the distribution function condition), it is possible to sign the four terms summing up to d3EU2=dS3 but three
are positive and one is negative, so we cannot sign this quantity in general.
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bEU2- C(S)
S
Two potentially privately optimal S
Utility: return minus cost of social capital
Figure 4: Net utility as a function of social capital: case of multiple extrema
for larger values of S) and thus the second local maximum becomes a global maximum. This
individual is thus more likely to be immobile and invest a lot more in social capital.
Hence, we have a rst complementarity between local social capital and mobility.
Complementarity property 1.When the localness of social capital is exogenous to workers
choice (that is,  and  are given), local social capital is associated, in the cross section of
workers, with low mobility rate, with large di¤erences across individuals even though they have
similar preferences.
Now, in a maximum of utility, we have an additional property: the convexity of costs C with
respect to S implies that the investment in social capital will be larger when the right hand
side of (12) is higher, i.e. when both risks of depreciation Pu and Pm (i.e. unemployment and
mobility) are lower and when the rates of depreciation is lower (that is,  and  are lower).
Again, if  = 0, the risk of unemployment plays no role on the choice of S, while the closer 
to 0, the lower the impact of Pm on the choice of S.
Complementarity property 2. For a given optimal choice of S and under assumption that
 > , if social capital is higher, the expected mobility rate is lower. In turn, any exogenous
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decrease in expected mobility increases the optimal level of social capital.
3.2 Choice of the composition of S
A natural extension is to consider how agents could choose their type of social capital: local
or professional or a combination of both. We will see that this reinforces, if anything, the
complementarity property 1. Indeed, assume now that agents can trade-o¤ the two types of
social capital in choosing  and  given a constraint, say
 +   1 + a, (13)
where 0 < a < 1 is a technologically-constrained parameter. They could for instance choose
 = a and  = 1 (mostly local social capital) or  = 1 and  = a (mostly professional
capital), or any interior combination. Simultaneously, they chose the total amount of S. In
other words, they have a control, albeit limited by equation (13), on the type of social capital.
The constraint of equation (13) reects the fact that there is no free-lunch: social capital must
depreciate in one dimension or the other.9 In this case, the program of the agents rewrites:
max
S;  ;
f
1   C(S; ; ) + EU2(S; ; )g
s:t: equation (13).
where the cost function now explicitly depends on the chosen depreciation rates: a lower depre-
ciation rate comes at a positive marginal cost, or
@C=@i < 0 for i = ; .
Using equations (11), (2) and substituting  by 1 + a   , we then have the following
program:
max
S; 
(
 C(S; 1 + b  ; ) + 
 
S  
Z w
b (1+a )S
G(z + S)F (z)dz
!)
.
9An alternative modelling choice would be to x  > 0 and  > 0 as exogenous parameters, i.e. tech-
nologically given, but dissociate two types of social capital Sl (local social capital) and Sp (professional social
capital) and let the agent invest optimally in these two dimensions. The program of the agent would then be
Max
Sl;Sp
f
1   C(Sl; Sp) + EU2(Sl; Sp)g. We dont learn much more from this exercise compared to the current
modelling choice so we do not push this possibility any further.
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The rst order condition on S is the same as in (12), while now, the optimal choice of  implies,
after a variable change:
dC
d
=
@C
@
@
@
+
@C
@
= S(Pu   Pm).
where @@ =  1 along the constraint (13). A simple cost function would be C(S;  + ) with
therefore perfect substituability between the choice of depreciation rates. Thus, the left-hand
side  @C@ +
@C
@
 0. This leads to particularly simple solutions: an interior solution and two
corner solutions:
 in an interior solution, the agent chooses  at an optimal point where Pm = Pu
 if there is no interior solution, i.e. for instance Pm > Pu, the agents chooses  = a and
 = 1
 if there is no interior solution, i.e. for instance Pu > Pm, the agents chooses  = 1 and
 = a
Let us rst discuss the interior solution. The interpretation is as follows: the probability to
be unemployed is the probability to loose a marginal unit of professional () social capital ; it
has to be equal to the probability to move, that is to loose a marginal unit of local () social
capital. Note however that the agent may not always be able to implement such a solution,
because it depends in large part on the external distributions of o¤ers. If for instance, there are
excellent o¤ers in region B, the agent will move with high probability and remain unemployed
with low probability. In other words, the agent has only a limited control on Pu and Pm.
When the agent selects one of the two corner solutions, the intuition is clear too. For
instance, the second corner solution occurs in a low mobility/high unemployment world where
Pu > Pm: since expected mobility is low, the agents will maximize the localness of their social
capital ( = 1) in order to reduce the depreciation of professional social capital. This will thus
further reinforce immobility. Hence, we uncover a new complementarity property:
Complementarity property 3. When agents can partly control the localness of social
capital, they choose preferentially local capital when they expect a low mobility rate compared to
the unemployment rate ; the opposite occurs when agents anticipate high mobility compared to
the unemployment rate: they try to minimize the depreciation of local social capital.
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4 Extension: employment protection
An interesting extension, in the European context, is the e¤ect of employment protection leg-
islation. By raising the expected duration of jobs, it induces investments in all sort of specic
capital, such as job specic skills, sector specic skills, housing and in our more specic case,
local social capital. We will thus explore this mechanism here.
Assume that workers in rst period may remain employed at the end of period 1 with
probability  . The previous analysis was thus simply the case  = 0. Here,  can be thought as
an index of employment protection. How does the previous analysis carry through? Well, the
employment status of employees now matter, and there are two cases to consider.
Unemployed workers in period 1 are not a¤ected, and make the same optimal choice bS as the
one determined before in the rst order condition (12). Consider now an employee with wage
w1 in rst period. In the beginning of the second period, she may loose her job with probability
1  and then face the same choice as before: draw a set of wage o¤ers w;w and then maximize
over the mobility/job acceptance decisions:
U2(S) = max fb+ (1  )S;w + S;w + (1  )Sg . (14)
Alternatively, she may have the option to keep her initial job with wage w1, and face the following
alternative with probability  :
U2(S) = max fw1 + S;w + S;w + (1  )Sg . (15)
In other words, denoting by U2(S; b; ; ) the utility in case of a layo¤, and U2(S;w1; 0; ) the
utility in case of no-layo¤ (b is replaced by w1 and  by 0), the program in rst period is now:
max
S
  C(S) + (1  )U2(S; b; ; ) + U2(S;w1; 0; ).
The rst order condition will be, using (12):
C 0(S) =  [1  Pm(b; ; )  Pu(b; ; )] + (1  ) [1  Pm(w1; 0; )] (16)
= (1  )

1  
Z w
wr
g(z + S)F (z)dz   G(wr)F (wr)

+

1 
Z w
w1
g(z + S)F (z)dz

.
It is easy to verify that the quantity in the right hand side increases with  , featuring that
the returns to local social capital are higher, the higher the likelihood to remain employed in
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the same local job. As a consequence, as  increases, C 0(S) increases, meaning that the optimal
level of social capital bS invested is higher. In the same vein, the expression above is increasing
in w1: the higher the initial wage, the higher bS. Finally, the interaction between the two is also
positive: d2 bS=Sw1d > 0.
We thus have the following implications.
Proposition 4: Employment protection raises the investment in local social capital. Higher
local wages (relative to wages in region B) also raises local social capital, as workers are more
likely to stay in region A. Finally, the two e¤ects interact complementarily: the marginal e¤ect
of employment protection on social capital is higher, the higher local wages.
5 Implications and conclusion
We have discussed here how low mobility could be the outcome of self-reinforcing factors. In
the present case, investments in local social capital are induced by low mobility and are in turn
themselves a factor of immobility. We have found several examples of complementarity between
high local social capital and low mobility rate. In Appendix, we also discuss social externalities,
that are important but not central to our main point here. Note that in Quentin et al. (2008),
we explored empirically the relations between social capital and labor markets and found, in line
with this paper, that social capital is strong factor of immobility. It is also a fairly large factor of
unemployment when social capital is clearly local, while other types of social capital are found
to have a positive e¤ect on employability. We also nd evidence of the reciprocal causality, that
is, individuals born in another region have accumulated less local social capital.
This has several implications for the debates on unemployment. First, unemployment has
increasingly been perceived in the last decades as the result of various market imperfections
impeding mobility and therefore raising the reservation wage of the unemployed. For example,
generous unemployment compensation raises the relative returns to staying in a local depressed
area. Strong employment protection raises incentives to invest in local skills as job duration is
anticipated to be much higher and thus reduces mobility ; it raises the incentives to invest in
job-specic skills and thus reduces job-to-job mobility ; good market imperfections and notably
obstacles to job creations in booming regions/sectors reduce the returns to mobility from the
depressed regions ; and wage compression reduces the returns to moving in the booming regions.
25
These alternative or complementary explanations can be found in Hassler et al. (2000, 2005),
Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998, 2002), Bertola and Ichino (1996), Wasmer (2006) and Bertola and
Rogerson (1997).
Our theory is not necessarily a new tentative explanation for high unemployment: local social
capital is simply complements to other explanations. However, we have a potential theory for
its high persistence. Local social capital may indeed be a bottleneck that prevents mobility. A
natural implication is that attempts to treat unemployment by changing the exogenous factors
raising mobility may fail if there is the type of vicious circle between immobility and high local
social capital. If local social capital is a bottleneck to higher mobility, deregulating labor markets
may simply raise inequality and the share of the informal economy, but will not ncessarily raise
mobility much. Said otherwise, if mobility is self-reinforced, it may not be enough to remove
the immobility-friendly institutions. An e¢ cient reform of the labor markets should instead
combine traditional reforms and develop incentives towards mobility.
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Appendix
A Extension: social externalities
In the model, we have exhibited a tendency in the model towards multiple local optima in social capital
choices of individuals, which is di¤erent from multiple equibria, in the sense that observationally close
workers may di¤er dramatically in their choices. However, each individual has a clear global optimum, and
thus except in a degenerate case, there is no multiplicity of equilibria. We can now o¤er a discussion of
the existence of multiple equilibria based on social externalities. For that, as we noted in the introduction,
there is a straightforward rationalization: in a world of low mobility, it may be even more di¢ cult, at an
individual level, to leaves ones friends to move to another region: if none of my friends have moved to
the city, I wont nd any old friendsthere. The opposite occurs in a high mobility world: I am more
likely to nd these old friends in the new place.10
The introduction of social externalities will, quite expectedly, reinforce the complementarity between
immobility and localness of social capital discussed above. Here, this will act through a standard mech-
anism: the fact that the choice of an individual is a¤ected by otherschoices.
There are several modelling choices here, because both the costs and the benets of investing in local
social capital and maintaining local connections depend heavily on others mobility rates: if everyone
leaves a neighborhood every other year, the returns to investing in local social capital is clearly lower. In
a reduced form, this type of externality can be modelled either through the returns to social capital or
through its cost, both depending on aggregate social capital.
We nd it slightly more convenient analytically to introduce that externality on the cost side, without
deep consequences. This development is coherent with the work of Glaeser et al. (2002) even if they take
the externality into account through the returns to social capital instead of the cost. Assume that the
level of social capital in the economy, S, decreases the cost of acquiring social capital for an individual.
For simplicity, we assume again that 1   and 1   are technologically given, and now that C(S)
becomes C(S; S) and multiplicative separability property such that: C(S; S) = C0(S)(S). We still
assume that C0(S) is increasing and convex and adds that (S) is decreasing and convex:
dC(S; S)=dS = C
0
0(S)(S) > 0 and d
2C(S; S)=dS2 = C
00
0 (S)(S) > 0,
dC(S; S)=dS = C0(S)
0
(S) < 0; and d2C(S; S)=dS
2
= C0(S)
00
(S) > 0,
d2C(S; S)=dSdS = d2C(S; S)=dSdS = C
0
0(S)
0
(S) < 0.
We will also assume that: lim
s!+1C
00
0 (S) > 0; lim
s!+1

0
(S) = 0. Furthermore, it is useful to note that
lim
s!+1
d2EU2
dS2 = 0 and lims!+1
d3EU2
dS3 < 0.
As for individuals, S is given. The rst order condition for their investment in human capital becomes:
dC(S; S)
dS
= C 00(S)(S) = 
dEU2
dS
. (A1)
This allows to rewrite a relationship between bS, the privately optimal level of social capital in
presence of externalities and S: bS = bS(S).
Assuming that S is the average level of social capital and a symmetric equilibrium (all agents are
identical and choose the same level of social capital at their optimum), the equilibrium value of S is
10One could also discuss the evolution of social norms with mobility. The idea is that, if mobility is low, old
friendsmay be more important for individuals than new friends, and vice-versa in a high mobility world.
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obtained by the intersection of the 45 degree line in the (S; S) locus with the curve bS(S). To characterizebS(S), let rewrite equation (A1) as:
F(S; S) = C 00(S)(S)  
dEU2
dS
= 0.
Using the implicit function theorem for dFdS 6= 0, we have:
dbS(S)
dS
=  
dF(bS;S)
dS
dF(bS;S)
dS
=   C
0
0(S)
0(S)
C
00
0 (S)(S)  d
2EU2
dS2
> 0, (A2)
i.e. bS(S) has a positive slope.
Remark that the rst order condition implies the equality between C 00(S)(S), the marginal cost of
investing in social capital and  dEU2dS , its time-discounted marginal return. For this rst order condition
to be a maximum, the necessary condition is: C
00
0 (S)(S) > 
d2EU2
dS2 . Otherwise, this intersection would
represent a minimum rather than a maximum. This implies that the denominator of equation (A2) is
necessarily positive for any optimal choice of an individual excepted if the marginal cost is tangent to the
marginal return. We do not treat this particular point as it is not our main concern.
To ease the analysis, we will assume again a quadratic functional form for C0(S) such that C
0
0(S) = S
and (S) = S
 
where  > 0. In this case, it is then possible to show that lim
s!+1
dbS(S)
dS
= 0. This suggests
that (at least for a minimal value of S) bS(S) is concave (since it has a positive slope and an horizontal
asymptote).
Since bS(S) is an increasing function in S and has an horizontal asymptote, there is necessarily
one intersection at least between bS(S) and the 45 line in the (S; S)   locus. Unfortunately, it is
di¢ cult (without additional strong assumptions on the distribution function of the model) to determine
the convexity of bS(S) (the expression of the implicit second order derivative is given in Appendix).
Therefore, we prefer to present several possible shapes for bS(S) as represented in gures 5 and 6.
Proposition A-5. There exists, at least, one stable equilibrium value of S in presence of externali-
ties.
Proof. The proof requires to treat several di¤erent cases.
 Let start by assuming that d3EU2dS3 < 0 8S 2 IR+0 . i.e. dEU2dS is strictly concave. In this case, bS(S)
is a function 8S 2 IR+0 . Two cases have to be analyzed: First, suppose that C 00(S)(S) > dEU2dS
for S ! 0. In this case, we necessarily have a corner solution (corresponding to a local maximum)
and we may have other interior solution(s). Note that the corner solution is unstable. Second,
suppose that C 00(S)(S) >
dEU2
dS for S ! 0. We do not have corner solution, but we must have an
interior solution: Since lim
s!0
bS(S) > 0 and lim
s!+1
dbS(S)
dS
= 0, we must have, at least, one intersection
between bS(S) and the 45 degree line.
 Suppose now that dEU2dS is not strictly concave (d
3EU2
dS3  0 ). In this case, bS(S) may be a
correspondence rather than a function. As before, as long as C 00(S)(S) >
dEU2
dS for S ! 0, we
have (at least) a corner solution (unstable). We should also have another interior solution (stable)
but we may have more. To better understand how this correspondence is shaped, it is instructive to
look at Figure (5) and (6). The end of this proof is presented for C 00(S)(S) <
dEU2
dS when S ! 0.
In this situation, bS(S) may be a correspondence, but with a positive slope. Let S1 be the tangency
point between C 00(S)(S) and
dEU2
dS . When S 2 (0; S1), if the correspondence crosses the 45 degree
line, we have a stable equilibrium. If it does not cross it, let us consider the second part of this
correspondence, that is for S 2 (0; S2), S2 being the tangency point between C 00(S)(S) and dEU2dS ,
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Figure 5: Case when bS(S) is a continuous function (unique extremum for S). Unique vs.
multiple equilibria.
for the highest level of S. This second part is necessarily higher (in terms of the level of S) and
S2 < S1. Since bS(S) has an horizontal asymptote, we necessarily have an intersection between
with the 45 degree line when the rst part of the correspondence does not have intersection.
This reinforces the type of complementarity already discussed in the benchmark model: indeed, we
had multiple maxima for individuals agents: one with low mobility & high local social capital vs. another
one with high mobility & low local social capital.11
Complementarity property 4. There are multiple aggregate equilibria: an equilibrium with low
aggregate local social capital implies a higher individual cost of investing in social capital, inducing higher
aggregate mobility ; and an equilibrium with a high aggregate local social capital reducing the individual
cost of investing in social capital, inducing aggregate immobility instead.
11This multiplicity of equilibria was also investigated by Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004a) in a study of migration
and social environment.
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Figure 6: Case when bS(S) is a correspondence (multiple extrema for individual S). Unique vs.
multiple equilibria
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B Theory Appendix
B.1 Distribution of a Max
Lemma A1. Let be two random variable X and Y such that X  F and Y  G, with F and G two
cumulative distribution functions dened over the support [0 B]. Let be Z = max fX;Y g. Then Z  FG:
Proof. Let be H the cumulative distribution function of Z.
H (z) =
Z z
0
Z z
0
fI [x > y] + I [y > x]g dF (x) dG (y) ,
H (z) =
Z z
0
Z z
0
I [x > y] dF (x) dG (y) +
Z z
0
Z z
0
I [y > x] dF (x) dG (y) ,
H (z) =
Z z
0
Z z
y
f (x) dF (y) +
Z z
0
Z z
x
g (y) dF (x) ,
H (z) =
Z z
0
[F (z)  F (y)] g(y)dy +
Z z
0
[G(z) G(x)] f(x)dx,
H (z) =
Z z
0
F (z)g(y)dy  
Z z
0
F (y)g(y)dy +
Z z
0
G(z)f(x)dx 
Z z
0
G(x)f(x)dx,
H (z) = 2F (z)G(z) 
Z z
0
fF (w)g(w) +G(w)f(w)g dw,
H (z) = 2F (z)G(z)  F (z)G(z),
H (z) = F (z)G(z).
Theorem A2: Let be N random variables X1; X2; :::; XN such that X1  F1, X2  F2, ...,
XN  FN , with F1; F2; :::; FN N cumulative distribution functions dened over the support [0 B]. Let be
Z = max fX1; X2; :::; XNg. Then Z  F1F2:::FN :
Proof. The proof is recursive. For the special case where N = 2 the proof has been showed in the
previous lemma. Suppose now the theorem is true for any N = p and show it is true for N = p + 1.
Let be Y = max fX1; X2; :::; Xpg and Z = max fX1; X2; :::; Xp+1g : If the theorem is true for N =
p, then Y  F1F2:::Fp:Moreover, Z = max fX1; X2; :::; Xp+1g = max fmax (X1; X2; :::; Xp) ; Xp+1g =
max fY;Xp+1g :The previous lemma tell us then: Z  (F1F2:::Fp)Fp+1 , Z  F1F2:::FpFp+1:Then if
the theorem is true for N = p, it is true for N = p + 1. Since according to the previous it is true for
N = 2, then, recursively, it is true for any N .
Corollary A3: Let be N random variables X1; X2; :::; XN such that X1  F , X2  F , ...,
XN  F , with F a cumulative distribution function dened over the support [0 B]. Let be Z =
max fX1; X2; :::; XNg. Then Z  FN :
Proof. The previous theorem shows that Z  FF:::F| {z }
N terms
, Z  FN :
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B.2 Decisions of the agent at a given S and determination of Pm, Pu, Pw.
B.2.1 Decision tree
There are three main possible cases for an agent, in order: remaining non-employed, accepting a local
o¤er, and nally accepting an o¤er in region B: we have thus
U2 = b+ (1  )S
if b+ (1  )S > w + S > w + (1  )S or b+ (1  )S > w + (1  )S > w + S
U2 = w + S
if w + S > b+ (1  )S > w + (1  )S or w + S > w + (1  )S > b+ (1  )S
U2 = w
 + (1  )S
if w + (1  )S > w + S > b+ (1  )S or w + (1  )S > b+ (1  )S > w + S.
B.2.2 Determination of Pm
The probability of moving is formally
Pm = P [fw + (1  )S > w + Sg \ fw + (1  )S > b+ (1  )Sg] , (B3)
and can be shown to be equal to
Pm =
Z w
0
Z w
0
I [w + (1  )S > w + S] I [w + (1  )S > b+ (1  )S] dG (w) dF (w) ,
or
Pm =
Z w
wr
F (z   S)g (z) dz.
which gives equation (4).
B.2.3 Determination of Pu
Pu writes formally as
Pu = P [fb+ (1  )S > w + Sg \ fb+ (1  )S > w + (1  )Sg] . (B4)
We have
Pu =
Z w
0
Z w
0
I [b+ (1  )S > w + S] I [b+ (1  )S > w + (1  )S] dG (w) dF (w) ,
or
Pu=
Z w
0
I [wr > w]G(wr)dF (w) = F (wr)G(wr).
Deriving, we have:
dPu
dS
= f(wr)G(wr)
@wr
@S
+ F (wr)g(wr)
@wr
@S
,
which leads to equation (7) and thus to Proposition 2.
35
B.2.4 Determination of Pw
The local employment probability is formally
Pw = P [fw + S > b+ (1  )Sg \ fw + S > w + (1  )Sg] , (B5)
and can be shown to be equal to
Pw =
Z w
0
Z w
0
I [w + S > b+ (1  )S] I [w + S > w + (1  )S] dG (w) dF (w) ,
or
Pw =
Z w
0
I [w > wr]G(w + S)dF (w) ,
which gives equation (8).
B.3 Proof of equation (11)
Proof. One derives now the value of EU2 in detailing the di¤erent cases:
EU2 =
Z w
0
Z w
0
8<: (b+ (1  )S) I [b  S > w] I [b+ (1  )S > w
 + (1  )S] +
(w + S)I [w + S) > b] I [w + S > w
 + (1  )S] +
(w + (1  )S)I [w + (1  )S > b+ (1  )S] I [w + (1  )S > w + S]
9=; dF (w)dG(w).
Extending the cumulative distribution function above its support, i.e. 8w;w > w ) F (w) = G(w) = 1
and f(w) = g(w) = 0, this expression rewrites as
EU2 = (b+ (1  )S)F (wr)G(wr)
+
Z w
wr
(w + S)G(w + S)dF (w)
+
Z w
wr
[w + (1  )S]F (w   S)dG(w).
Pose S0 = S and note that wr = wr + S0, we can rewrite it as
EU2 = (b+ (1  )S)F (wr)G(wr)
+
Z w
wr
(w + S)G(w + S0)dF (w)
+
Z w
wr
[w + (1  )S]F (w   S0)dG(w).
A variable change is useful: pose z = w   S0, we have
EU2 = (b+ (1  )S)F (wr)G(wr)
+
Z w
wr
(w + S)G(w + S0)f(w)dw
+
Z w S0
wr
(z + S)F (z)g(z + S0)dz. (B6)
Note thatZ w S0
wr
(z + S)F (z)g(z + S0)dz =
Z w
wr
(z + S)F (z)g(z + S0)dz  
Z w
w S0
(z + S)F (z)g(z + S0)dz,
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and, in the second term, z + S0 > w thus, g(z + S0)  0. The integrals in (B6) can thus be simplied as
EU2 = (b+ (1  )S)F (wr)G(wr)
+
Z w
wr
(w + S)d[G(w + S0)F (w)]dw. (B7)
Note also that wr + S = b+ (1  )S, hence there is a simplication here. Let us integrate (B7) by
part. We haveZ w
wr
(w + S)d[G(w + S0)F (w)]dw = w + S   (wr + S)G(wr)F (wr) 
Z w
wr
F (w)G(w + S0)dw,
which immediately implies
EU2 = w + S  
Z w
wr
F (w)G(w + S0)dw,
or
EU2 = w + S  
Z w
b S
G(z + S)F (z)dz. (B8)
Deriving with respect to S leads to
@EU2
@S
= 1  G(wr)F (wr)  
Z w
wr
g(z + S)F (z)dz.
B.4 Properties of EU2
B.4.1 First order derivative
Deriving equation (11), we have
dEU2
dS
= 1  G(wr)F (wr)  
Z w
wr
g(z + S)F (z)dz. (B9)
Then, we can rewrite Pm after a change of variable:
Pm =
Z w
wr
F (z   S)g(z)dz
=
Z w S
wr S
F (z0)g(z0 + S)dz0,
with z0 = z   S. Since wr   S = wr and g(z0 + S)  0 for all z0 > gw   S, the last term of
equation (B9) precisely corresponds to Pm. Hence, equation (12).
B.4.2 Second order derivative
Replacing dPm=dS and dPu=dS as calculated in Section 2 into (B9), we have:
d2EU2=dS
2 =  (   )F (wr)g(wr) + 2
Z w
wr
f(z   S)g(z)dz
 [ f(wr)G(wr) + F (wr)g(wr)(   )].
Rearranging terms, we obtain
d2EU2=dS
2 = F (wr)g(wr)(   )2 + 2f(wr)G(wr) + 2
Z w
wr
f(z   S)g(z)dz, (B10)
which is strictly positive unless  =  = 0.
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B.4.3 Third order derivative
Deriving (B10), we have then, after rearranging terms,
d3EU2=dS
3 = g0(wr)F (wr)(   )3 + (   )2f(wr)g(wr)
 3
Z w
wr
f 0(z   S)g(z)dz   3f 0(wr)G(wr).
Again, this is equal to zero when  =  = 0. The sign is ambiguous.
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